In Part 1 we described how a trait or symptom might be conceptualized as a prototype, and we reported a method for generating a prototype empirically (Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, & Parad, 1981) . To derive the prototype of an agressive-impulsive child, for example, we identified the most common characteristics (feelings, thoughts, behaviors) that experts think of when they imagine a typical aggressive-impulsive child. The composite set of features is viewed as a cognitive structure that depicts an idealized member of that category.
In our previous work we have used the construct of a prototype to conceptualize illdefined terms like depression. A prototype consists of the most common features or properties of members of a category and thus describes a theoretical ideal or standard against which real people can be evaluated. All of the prototype's properties are assumed to characterize at least some members of the category, but no one property is necessary or sufficient for membership in the category. Therefore, it is possible that no actual person would match the theoretical prototype perfectly. Instead, different people would approximate it to different degrees. The more closely a person approximates the ideal, the more the person typifies the concept.
In the present article we report three studies that tested hypotheses about adults suggested by this conceptual approach. The first study relates an observer's impression of a target person to the number of prototypic features in the stimulus description. The more features present, the stronger the impression of the corresponding trait or symptom. The second study extends the approach to explain disagreement among observers. When a stimulus description contains relatively few prototypic features, some observers judge the trait to be present and other observers judge the trait to be absent; the resulting disagreement lowers the interjudge reliability. The third study examines the role of irrelevant features in producing disagreement among observers. It considers whether irrelevant features contribute as much to disagreement as a shortage of relevant prototypic features.
Earlier (Horowitz et al., 1981 ) studies used the term prototype to discuss a category (e.g., a diagnosis). Here we use the term to describe a dimension (e.g., a personality trait that varies quantitatively). The first case is clear-cut but the second may require some comment. In the work described below, we tentatively view a trait as the degree to which a person approximates some idealized state portrayed by the prototype. That is, we assume that the trait of being birdlike tells the degree to which an organism approximates an idealized bird; similarly, that the trait of being depressed tells the degree to which a person approximates an idealized depressed person. This assumption allows us to cover a broad range of phenomena, though ultimately it will have to be tested empirically.
Study 1
A prototype allows us to determine how closely the description of a given person matches a theoretical ideal. The closer the match, the stronger the impression should be that the person is a member of the category. That is, a person who exhibits more prototypic features should seem like a better example of the category. For example, suppose the description of a person contained features of the prototype of a depressed person. We would expect the impression of depression to increase with the number of prototypic features embedded in the description. The more prototypic features (a) the higher the probability of activating the full prototype and (b) the more depressed the person should seem. The following study tested this hypothesis.
Method
The prototype of a depressed person served as a standard for evaluating stimulus descriptions. The features of this prototype have been described by Horowitz, French, & Anderson (in press) . To generate that prototype 35 students in an introductory psychology class at Stanford University were asked to think of the best example they could of someone who was depressed. They were asked to describe the person's most usual feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. A procedure similar to that described by Horowitz et al. (1981) was used to tabulate the different features and determine their relative frequencies.
In the earlier studies we used features that occurred with a probability of .29 or higher to form a final prototype. Twenty-one features met the .29-or-higher criterion, but in order to have a larger pool of features for the present studies, we relaxed the criterion of prototypicality to .20. Therefore, we identified all features that occurred with a probability of .20 or more. Thirtyseven features met this criterion, some of which are: "feels inferior, worthless, inadequate"; "thinks 'Everyone is against me' "; "has a pessimistic attitude, expects the worst"; "cries easily"; and "avoids social contacts, isolates self from others."
The features have also been cluster analyzed, and they fall into four separate clusters. One contains feelings and thoughts describing low self-esteem and helplessness; a second describes self-isolation and loneliness; a third describes anger and aggression; and a fourth describes poor self-control (e.g., overeating, problems with being productive in work).
Procedure. In this experiment we examined the original 35 essays describing depressed people and identified essays with few or many prototypic features. We compared each essay to the prototype and counted the number of prototypic features in each. Two of the authors counted the number of prototypic features in each and agreed perfectly in their counts. We then formed three sets of essays with two essays in each set. One set contained essays with only one prototypic feature; another contained essays with 4-9 prototypic features; a third contained essays with 17-20 prototypic features. The three sets are described as having few, medium, or many prototypic features. The word "depressed" did not appear explicitly in any of them. The resulting six essays each described a depressed person, but those with only one prototypic feature did so through many idiosyncratic features that had not achieved prototype status.
These essays were then presented to 24 other subjects, students in the introductory psychology class at Stanford University, who participated in the study to satisfy a course requirement. The order of essays was varied systematically across subjects. The subjects were asked to read each essay and make several judgments. First, the subject was asked to rate the person along various dimensions: how likeable the person seemed, how lonely, how angry, how depressed, and how superior and inferior to others the person seemed to feel. We were primarily interested in the ratings of depression, which were made along a 5-point scale from 1 ("not depressed") to 5 ("very depressed"). Then the subject examined a list of 24 adjectives, selecting the 5 adjectives that best characterized the person. The list included the word "depressed" and 23 other adjectives: hostile, happy, introverted, uncomfortable, sensitive, clownish, easygoing, competitive, selfish, disturbed, arrogant, resentful, lonely, aggressive, shy, ineffective, mean, vulnerable, needy, ambitious, self-centered, anxious, angry.
Results
First we examined the subjects' ratings of the person's depression. For essays with one feature, the mean rating of depression was 2.71; for essays with 4-9 features, the mean rating was 3.58; for essays with 17-20 features, the mean rating was 4.88, F(2, 46) = 66.4, p< .001.
We also examined the subjects' choice of adjectives for describing the person. The probability that "depressed" was selected increased as the number of prototypic features increased. "Depressed" was selected with the following relative frequencies for the three sets, .04, .20, and .69, respectively. The difference in frequency was significant, X 2 (2)= 17.7, p<. 01.
Discussion
The more prototypic features the essay contained, the more often the person was described as depressed. The essays themselves, of course, were each describing somebody's "best example" of a depressed person, but the descriptions differed in how well they communicated depression. The more prototypic features the essay contained, the more depressed the person seemed.
Similar findings have been reported by Horowitz, French, and Anderson (in press) concerning the trait of loneliness. In that experiment subjects were asked to judge from the descriptions of people whether they were lonely. The descriptions varied in the number of features from the prototype of a lonely person. The stimulus descriptions contained 1-2, 5-6, or 9-10 prototypic features, and the relative frequency of the judgment "lonely" for each group was .42, .71, and .89, respectively. Thus, the more prototypic features an essay contains, the stronger is the impression of the corresponding trait. This is the reason that we regard traits in terms of a prototype. A prototype does indeed portray a discrete category, but people vary in the degree to which they resemble the category. The degree of resemblance defines a continuum that raters, at least, seem to use in judging the trait. Thus, observers' ratings of a trait would be highly correlated with prototypicality. Despite this correlation, however, the two attributes may still be conceptually different: To say that someone resembles the prototype of a depressed person to some extent is not to say that the person is depressed. Separating these attributes will be a task for future research.
Partial prototypes and interjudge disagreement. These results suggest that a prototype can be used to clarify interjudge disagreement. If a stimulus description contains some features of a prototype but not many, then some observers apply the trait and others do not. A description with a few prototypic features of depression led some judges to describe the person as depressed and other judges to describe the person in other ways. Apparently, a few prototypic features activate the concept or trait in some respondents but not in others, producing disagreement among judges.
Cases with a few prototypic features are like the penguins of the bird kingdom. We can all agree that canaries and sparrows are birds; they have lots of birdlike features, and judges agree with each other in calling them birds. But when we are faced with penguins, which have fewer birdlike features, we disagree. Some of us think of penguins as birds, and others think of penguins as nonbirds, hence, interjudge disagreement and lower reliability.
Similarly, a prototype may help explain disagreement among judges over a diagnostic label. Various studies have examined the agreement between two diagnosticians diagnosing the same patients (see the review by Spitzer & Fleiss, 1974) . In recent studies Spitzer, Forman, & Nee, 1979 ) overall values of kappa are reported that range from .54 to .78. Studies of this kind generally focus on the behavior of judges rather than on the nature of a stimulus that generates disagreement. The concept of a prototype, however, shifts the focus to the stimulus as a way of explaining the disagreement. Table 1 presents a matrix of hypothetical data showing how five judges might judge six people with respect to some trait or diagnosis. In the matrix, 1 signifies "yes" and 0 signifies "no." The last column shows the mean of the Is and Os for each stimulus person, that is, the proportion of judges who thought that that person belonged to the category.
With data like these different measures of reliability can be defined (see Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) . One common measure is the mean value of the correlation between the original judges' Is and Os. If the judges are assumed to be a random sample from some specified universe of judges (e.g., psychiatrists), this measure estimates the expected correlation between pairs of judges randomly sampled from the universe. Studies of diagnostic reliability typically examine this kind of reliability. Another kind of measure describes the stability of the row means (based on k judges) as descriptive measures. This kind of measure estimates the expected correlation between the means of two sets each containing k judges assumed to be randomly sampled from the same universe. If the first type of reliability is positive, the second will be larger and will approach 1 as k, the number of judges, increases. This principle is a generalization of the SpearmanBrown formula (Lord & Novick, 1968) . Therefore, by having a large enough panel of judges, we can generally produce means that are as reliable as we wish (see Horowitz, Inouye, & Siegelman, 1979) .
Once the &-judge means are sufficiently reliable, they can be related to the prototype. In Table 1 , Person 2 was always diagnosed positively (the mean rating was 1.00), so that person should closely match the prototype. Person 4 was always diagnosed negatively, so that person should least match the prototype. People at the extremes are clear (unambiguous) cases; they either match or do not match the prototype.
Person 3, however, generated disagreement, and the mixture of Is and Os led to an intermediate mean. Such persons are ambiguous-reliably ambiguous, if the means are stable. Persons of this type should exhibit some, but not many, features of the prototype. Such cases produce interjudge disagreement because they partially match the prototype. As long as cases exist that partially match the prototype, ambiguity and interjudge disagreements are inevitable.
Study 2
The concept of a prototype may thus be used to clarify disagreement among judges in judging a trait. If a person is described by many prototypic features of depression, for example, most observers would agree with each other that the person is depressed. In that case the interrater reliability should be high. However, when the description of a person contains just a few prototypic features, at least two different possibilities exist. One is that the relatively small number of features would produce generally lower ratings of depression in most judges, so that judges would generally agree about the lower rating. The other possibility is that the relatively small number of features would activate the full prototype in some observers and fail to do so in other observers. In that case some judges would see the stimulus person as quite depressed, whereas other judges would see the stimulus person as not depressed. According to this hypothesis, when only a small number of prototypic features are present, we would observe greater variability among observers and lower interrater reliability.
To test this hypothesis we used the pro-totype of a depressed person as a standard for assessing psychiatric patients. Once appropriate cases were identified, we expected to observe more disagreement among judges over cases that showed relatively fewer prototypic features. It was hypothesized that such cases would activate the prototype in some observers but not in others, producing lower interjudge reliability.
Method
Twenty-eight patients about to undergo psychotherapy had been interviewed as part of an earlier study (Bloch, Bond, Quails, Yalom, & Zimmerman, 1977) . The videotapes of those interviews became the stimuli for the present study. The participants were all outpatients at a psychiatric clinic, with a neurotic disorder or a character disorder, and about to begin psychotherapy. The interview was a semistructured intake interview, with the interviewer exploring details of the patient's treatment goals where appropriate.
In order to sample patients who varied in the degree of their depression, we divided the patients into three groups. Those in one group had mentioned depression as a major symptom when they applied for treatment, so their depression was highly salient. Those in a second group had mentioned depression only as a secondary symptom; other symptoms had brought them to treatment. Those in a third group did not mention depression at all when they applied for treatment; as shown below, they too were somewhat depressed-as people seeking psychotherapy generally are-but their depression was less salient. These three groups thus varied in the salience of depression as a symptom, and they are identified as Levels 1, 2, and 3 ("less salient" to "more salient"). We then sampled four cases from each subgroup, two males and two females, forming a set of 12 videotaped interviews.
The first 20 minutes of each videotape was presented to 24 clinicians who are described below. This section of the interview concerned background information, interpersonal difficulties, and goals of treatment, but it did not explore any patient's depression per se. Variants of the word "depression" never occurred in the presented segment of the interview. The 12 videotapes were presented at biweekly intervals, one videotape per session. The order of videotapes was arranged so that successive blocks of three sessions contained one tape from each level of depression in counterbalanced order. There were two different orders of presentation; half the clinicians viewed the tapes in one order and half in the other order.
In order to identify prototypic features in the interviews, we presented the clinicians with a checklist of characteristics at the beginning of the session, and they were asked to look for these characteristics in the patients. The list contained various descriptive phrasesadjectives, interpersonal problems, and so on-that might characterize anybody. The 37 features of the prototype of a depressed person were embedded in this list, so it was possible to count the number of features that each clinician had endorsed.
The clinicians were in training at Pacific Graduate School of Psychology, an institution that provides doctoral level training in clinical psychology. They were currently engaged in clinical work, generally as professionals in some allied clinical profession. On the average, they had had 4 years of clinical experience. The mean age of the judges was 37.8 years. After completing the checklist, they also rated the patient along various dimensions, including how depressed the patient seemed, how anxious, and so on; they also rated their corresponding level of confidence over each of these judgments.
Results
Our first step was to show that patients at the three levels did differ in the number of prototypic features that they displayed (and concomitantly in their ratings of depression). Once that difference was established, we could then examine whether the judges agreed more about patients who displayed many prototypic features.
For each patient we determined the mean number of prototypic features that had been identified by the 24 judges. The means for the 12 patients ranged from 11.1 to 30.9, with a reliability of .970. For the three groups (Levels 1, 2, and 3), the means were 13.9, 17.1, and 25.6, respectively. An analysis of variance was performed to determine whether the three groups differed significantly in the number of prototypic features observed, and the results showed that the difference was significant, F(2, 9) = 12.60, p < .005. Each patient's depression was also rated by each judge along a scale from 1 (not depressed) to 5 (very depressed). The mean rating of depression for the 12 patients ranged from 2.7 to 4.6, with a reliability of .947. For the three groups (Levels 1, 2, and 3), the overall means were 2.8, 3.3, and 4.1, respectively. These means also differed significantly, F(2, 9) = 21.96, p < .001.
The mean ratings of depression were also correlated (patient by patient) with the mean number of prototypic features identified. The value of r between the two measures was .903, p < .001. This result is consistent with findings from studies of cognitive psychology that show that the rating of a characteristic (e.g., how birdlike a creature is) covaries with the number of prototypic features (see Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976 ). In addition, each of these measures correlated highly with the mean confidence ratings. The r was .875 with the mean ratings of depression and .828 with the mean number of prototypic features, p < .001 in both cases.
Because the same clinicians who had identified prototypic features had also provided ratings of depression, we wanted to examine the degree of this relationship when separate groups judged each variable. Therefore, we randomly divided the clinicians into two subgroups of 12 judges each. The mean number of prototypic features identified by one subgroup was correlated with the mean ratings of depression judged by the other subgroup. This procedure of dividing the judges into random subgroups was repeated seven times, yielding seven values of r that ranged from .78 to .94. The mean r was .86 (p < .001), so the correlation is still high for independent groups of judges.
The three groups of patients (Levels 1, 2, and 3) thus differed in the number of prototypic features they exhibited and in their degree of rated depression. Therefore, we can now turn to our major hypothesis that the degree of agreement among judges covaries with the number of prototypic features. It should be noted that patients of Level 1 were somewhat depressed too: Their mean number of prototypic features was 13.9, not 0, and their mean rating of depression was 2.8 (on a 5-point scale), not 1. Thus, we expected to observe substantial disagreement among judges in rating the depression of these patients, and greater agreement as the number of prototypic features increased.
The interjudge agreement was assessed in three ways. For one thing we computed the variance of the 24 ratings for each individual patient. The mean variance of the ratings of patients at Level 1 was .90; that at Level 2, .55; and that at Level 3, .30. A one-way analysis of variance was performed, and the variation was significant, F(2, 9) = 13.88, p < .01. Furthermore, the three sets of variances were nonoverlapping. The variance of the ratings of patients at Level 1 were all greater than those at Level 2, and those at Level 2 were all greater than those at Level 3.
Next we determined the mode of the 24 ratings for each patient; that is, we determined which rating of depression (1-5) had been assigned most often by the 24 judges. Then we noted the mode's frequency of occurrence, and that frequency was taken as a measure of agreement among judges for each patient: The higher the frequency of the mode, the more the judges had agreed in rating that patient. The three groups of patients differed significantly on this measure. The mean frequencies of the mode for patients of Levels 1, 2, and 3 were, 8.2, 11.5, and 17.0, respectively, F(2, 9) = 35.7, p < .0001. Furthermore, the three distributions were nonoverlapping. For patients of Level 1, the values ranged from 8 to 9; for those of Level 2, 10 to 14; for those of Level 3, 15 to 19. As a third measure of agreement, we computed the reliability of the ratings of depression for each level. A two-way analysis of variance was performed (4 patients by 24 judges), and from the results we computed the measures based on the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) that Shrout and Fleiss (1979) denote: ICC (3, 1) and ICC (3, 24). The first describes the consistency between pairs of judges in applying a label to the cases; the second describes the stability of the 24-judge means as descriptions of each case. Reliability measures of this kind have been discussed by other writers (e.g., Bartko, 1976; Block, 1961; Gottesman & Shields, 1972; Horowitz, Inouye & Siegelman, 1979 ).
The results showed that patients at Level 3 (with more prototypic features) were judged most reliably. Judgments of Level 2 patients were less reliable, and those at Level 1, still less reliable. The three values of ICC (3, 1) for Levels 1, 2, and 3, were .00, .11, and .41, respectively. The corresponding values of ICC (3, 24) were .00, .74, and .94.
These results suggest that the more prototypic features a case presentation contains, the more the judges agree with each other in assigning ratings. When there are fewer features, opinions become more variable. In that case, the features apparently activate the prototype in some judges but not in others. For example, the ratings of two of the patients at Level 1 each exhibited two modes on opposite sides of middle-a mode of 2 and a mode of 4. Such disagreement lowers the interjudge reliability.
One might ask whether the greater agreement in judging Level 3 patients had to do with a ceiling effect. For example, a depressed patient of Level 3 might seem so depressed that all judges would use a rating of 5 and there would be no room for disagreement. In actual fact, however, the single most frequent rating of Level 3 patients was 4, not 5; 65% of all the ratings at this level were 4. For patients at the other end of the scale (Level 1), the single most frequent rating was 2. Thus, the modal rating of patients at Level 1 and Level 3 were equally distant from an end of the scale, and the difference between levels is apparently not due to a ceiling effect.
Discussion
These results support the hypothesis that the number of prototypic features in case material is related to the degree of agreement among judges. When there are fewer prototypic features, not only is the mean rating lower, but the variability in the ratings also increases: The judges disagree with each other more, lowering the interjudge reliability. Therefore, when we are studying a characteristic like depression that is not well defined, it is important to sample subjects with many prototypic features. Prototypic cases cannot be identified by simply having one or two raters judge the person along a single dimension: Either a panel of judges must agree that a case is a good instance, or the case itself must display a number of prototypic features. Otherwise, the reliability of the judgments would be lower and would reduce the possible correlation with other variables.
Furthermore, people with middle ratings may be more heterogeneous in the nature of their depression than people with higher ratings of depression. For example, consider a person who is "somewhat depressed," perhaps a person who exhibits 12 prototypic features out of a possible 37. The number of different 12-feature subsets that could be formed out of the entire set of 37 would be quite large; many of these subsets would have nonoverlapping features with each other. One subset might contain only features of low self-esteem, whereas another might contain only features of loneliness. Therefore, two people described as "somewhat depressed" might exhibit quite different sets of features. On the other hand, people who are severely depressed would each exhibit many more prototypic features and would therefore overlap in their features; as a group they would be more like each other. Thus, we reach the conclusion that the group that is judged more reliably (i.e., the more depressed group) is also likely to be more homogeneous.
When a target person shows just a few prototypic features, the judges may also be more susceptible to bias. That is, a stimulus that contains just a few prototypic features could potentially be judged either as an instance of the prototype or not. If the context leads judges to focus on the few prototypic features or to expect the person to be a prototypic case, then the judges could find confirmatory evidence in the relatively few prototypic features. But if the same judges were led to focus on nonprototypic features or expected the target person to be nonprototypic, then they might overlook the prototypic features that were present and regard the target person as a noninstance. Thus, the observers' biases and expectations might influence their perception of a stimulus person more if the stimulus contained relatively few prototypic features. Such factors could also contribute to unreliability.
Study 3
Study 2 showed that prototypicality is related to interobserver agreement. This result may help explain disagreement among judges in diagnosing psychiatric cases. As Cantor, Smith, French, and Mezzich (1980) have suggested, a psychiatric diagnostic category may be viewed as a prototype that consists of features like those cited in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IH; American Psychiatric Association, 1980 ). When judges disagree over a diagnostic label, we might infer that the presence of only a few prototypic features in the case material has activated the prototype in some judges but not in others.
The diagnostic process, however, may differ in an important way from the process proposed in Study 2. A diagnostic category is usually considered in relation to other contrasting categories, so a diagnostician has to consider not only the presence of relevant features but also the absence of irrelevant features. In other words, irrelevant features (arising from contrasting categories) may contribute to diagnostic disagreement.
We therefore wanted to consider the role of irrelevant features. Do clinicians disagree about a diagnosis simply because there are too few relevant features, or because there are too many irrelevant features, or both? At least two reasonable hypotheses can be considered. The first hypothesis is that disagreement arises primarily from a shortage of prototypic features. A case description with just a few prototypic features would activate the category in some observers but not in other observers. The second hypothesis is that diagnostic disagreement arises primarily from the presence of irrelevant features (arising from contrasting categories). According to this hypothesis judges disagree when irrelevant features are present along with the relevant prototypic ones.
Study 3 compared these two hypotheses. First we identified cases which judges had disagreed in diagnosing, and then we examined the presence of relevant and irrelevant features in the case material.
Method
Patients were sampled from a large outpatient psychiatric clinic. Ten clinicians diagnosed each patient from a case description, and the case was scored to determine, for a given diagnosis, what proportion of the judges had applied that label. A proportion of .90, for example, indicates that the judges agreed in diagnosing the case, but a proportion of .50 indicates that they disagreed.
Selection of cases. Cases were selected from the files of the Mt. Zion Psychiatric Clinic, a large outpatient clinic in San Francisco with a heterogeneous clientele. The sample was limited to adults who had sought and received individual psychotherapy. Twenty-six patients were sampled randomly from the nearly 2,000 cases that had been closed during the preceding 5 years. Selected cases met the following criteria: The patient was between the ages of 18 and 60 years and had met with a therapist for at least 5 sessions in individual psychotherapy; also, the patient's chart contained a completed application, a report of the intake interview, and the therapist's closing summary. The final sample contained 12 men and 14 women who ranged in age from 18 to 60 years. Two clinical psychologists read all the material in each chart and summarized each of the 26 cases, arranging the material into a standard format.
Procedure. The case summaries were presented to 20 experienced clinicians who read and diagnosed the cases. These judges consisted of nine psychiatrists, seven clinical psychologists, and four social workers. They were psychoanalytically oriented and affiliated with Mt. Zion Psychiatric Clinic or with Stanford University. Each case summary was read by 10 judges.
We compiled a list of diagnostic labels that were used most often throughout patients' charts at the Mt. Zion clinic; they were chosen because of their common usage in the setting from which both patients and clinicians were drawn. (At the time the study began, DSM-III was not yet available.) The categories included: paranoid schizophrenia, hysterical neurosis, depressive neurosis, anxiety neurosis, hysterical character, depressive character, passive-compliant character, schizoid character, narcissistic character, impulse-ridden character, and borderline character. A checklist of diagnostic categories was formed and presented along with each case description.
The clinicians were asked to read each case description and place a tally next to all diagnostic labels that might reasonably apply to that patient. The proportion of judges who applied a diagnostic label to a case as a possible diagnosis was denoted c (for consensus). Then, for different diagnostic categories, we formed three-case sets such that one case had a high value of c (between .80 and 1.00), a second had a medium value (between .30 and .SO), and a third had a zero value. For example, the three cases selected for the diagnosis "paranoid schizophrenia" had c values of .90, .40, and .00, respectively. Cases with medium values of c were ones in which judges had disagreed, and these cases were of particular interest. In this way we generated eight sets (involving 24 cases). Across the eight sets the mean of the high c values was .82; of the medium c values, .40; and of the zero c values, .00. The diagnostic labels corresponding to the eight sets were: anxiety neurosis, impulse-ridden character, hysterical neurosis, schizoid character, paranoid schizophrenia, phobic neurosis, anxiety neurosis, and narcissistic character. We generated two sets of case descriptions for the diagnostic label anxiety neurosis in order to check the stability of the findings across sets within a diagnostic category.
Next we needed to identify prototypic features for each diagnostic category and to determine which ones were present in each case. Features cited as diagnostic criteria in DSM-III (APA, 1980) were taken as the most up-to-date set of prototypic features for a given category. For example, features of the category "narcissistic character" were drawn from the diagnostic criteria of the narcissistic personality disorder in DSM-III (APA, 1980, p. 317) . The features for this prototype were: (a) has grandiose sense of self-importance or uniqueness; exaggerates own achievements and talents; focuses on how special his/her own problems are; (b) has fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love; (c) is exhibitionistic; requires constant attention and admiration; (d) responds to criticism, indifference, or defeat with cool indifference or feelings of rage, inferiority, shame, humiliation, or emptiness; (e) disturbed interpersonal relationships of one of the following types-a feeling of entitlement (special favors are due him/her); interpersonal exploitiveness (takes advantage of others); relationships alternate between overidealization and devaluation; lack of empathy with others. These features were taken to be the major prototypic features of that category. All of these features were randomized and organized into a checklist.
The next step was to determine in a mechanical fashion whether the features of a given prototype were present in each case description. We considered asking clinicians to make judgments about the presence of features in each case, but clinicians' responses could be biased in the following way: Clinicians might find themselves implicitly diagnosing a case whether they were instructed to do so or not, and their implicit diagnoses might influence their perceptions of features. In that case clinicians' perceptions of features might not be independent of diagnoses. To minimize this kind of bias, we preferred to have naive subjects judge, almost mechanically, whether each feature was present or absent in each case description. The judges were 40 students enrolled in a class of introductory psychology at Stanford University. They were naive about the meaning of diagnoses, the selection of cases, and the purpose of the study.
The eight sets of cases were divided randomly into two subsets, and 20 subjects were tested on the 12 cases of each subset. The subjects were asked to read each case description, and referring back to it as often as they wished, to rate each feature on a 5-point scale (0-the feature was definitely absent in the case; 4-the feature was definitely present). The order of cases was systematically varied from subject to subject. Then, for the cases of each set, we computed the mean rating of the prototypic features for that diagnostic category; separately, we also computed the mean rating of all the other (irrelevant) features.
Results
The mean ratings of the relevant features for each case were averaged across all diagnostic categories. The means for the high c, medium c, and zero c cases were 3.05, 2.49, and 1.49, respectively. A randomizedblocks analysis of variance (three levels of c by diagnostic categories) showed that the effect of c was highly significant, F(2, 14) = 9.23, p < .005.
We also computed the mean rating of the irrelevant features for each case and averaged those means across all diagnostic categories. The means for the three levels of c were 1.60, 1.76, and 1.95, respectively. The difference was not significant, F(2, 14) = l.21,p> .20.
A rating of 3 or 4 meant that the judge considered the feature to be present in the case material. For each case we identified each feature that was rated 3 or 4 by more than half the judges. Then, for each case, we computed the proportion of the relevant features and the proportion of the irrelevant features that met this criterion. Averaged across sets, the mean proportion of relevant features present was 0.77,0.57, and 0.03, for the high-, medium-, and zero-c cases, respectively, F(2, 14) = 12.97, p < .001. The corresponding mean proportions for the irrelevant features were 0.17, 0.26, and 0.31, respectively, F(2, 14) = 1.54, p > .20. Thus, the overall pattern was the same as the one described above.
Discussion
These results suggest that, on the average across sets, the presence of relevant features is more discriminating than the absence of irrelevant features. That is, the judges' disagreement over a medium-c case seems to have arisen more from a shortage of relevant prototypic features than from the presence of irrelevant features.
Nonetheless, circumstances could still exist in which irrelevant features might play an important role in generating disagreement among judges. For example, suppose some irrelevant features in a case description activated a prototype that seemed incompatible with a prevailing prototype. Then judges might be disposed to choose between the two, and they might differ in their final choice. If they disagreed, the reliability would be lower. The disagreement, though, would be due not to a shortage of features, but rather to a competition between prototypes that seemed mutually exclusive. Therefore, we still need to consider the kind of stimulus material that activates competing, perhaps contradictory, prototypes.
The activation of contradictory prototypes. It would be possible to derive prototypes of two personality types that are generally viewed as contradictory-for example, that of an introvert and that of an extravert (see Cantor & Mischel, 1977 , or that of a compulsive personality and that of a hysterical personality. To say that these prototypes are contradictory probably means that they contain features that are regarded as opposites-quiet in one prototype, loud in the other; passive versus active; isolated versus sociable. In practice, however, different features are never perfectly correlated, so the same person could be both quiet and friendly. Furthermore, there are often features in each prototype that are simply irrelevant to features in the other. Therefore, it is very possible for the same person to exhibit features of contradictory prototypes. Such a description might seem a bit inconsistent, though, and it is known that such descriptions are harder to remember (Cantor & Mischel, 1979) .
Two prototypes derived by Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, and Parad (1981) might seem contradictory, namely, those of an aggressive-impulsive and a depressed-withdrawn child. One describes a child that is intimidating and has tantrums, whereas the other describes a child that is unassertive and quiet. Yet it would be possible to construct a plausible description of a child that had features of both-for example, a child who cried and felt sad but, at the same time, acted in a hostile way toward others and had tantrums. Such a mixture of features could activate both prototypes and would thus be ambiguous.
Ambiguity of this type might be important if the two prototypes called for different treatment interventions. For example, a prototypic aggressive-impulsive child might need to have his aggression restrained with firm limits, whereas a prototypic depressedwithdrawn child might need help in becoming more directly assertive. In that case an ambiguous child with mixed features would invite contradictory interventions, so that different therapists might treat the child differently, or the same therapist might vary on different occasions. Such contradictory interventions can impede a child's therapeutic progress.
Sometimes an experienced therapist is able to integrate features of different prototypes through some more sophisticated concept. For example, the concept of a paranoid person suggests features of both depression and aggression (Schwartz, 1964) . The experts' prototypes of an aggressive-impulsive child and a depressed-withdrawn child contained a number of overlapping features (more so than the novices' prototypes), and the overlapping features seem to fit the concept of a paranoid style: feels angry, has low self-esteem, sees others as hostile, acts in a hostile way towards others, and feels sad. These overlapping features may enable experts to generate an integrating concept more readily than novices. In that case a description that seemed ambiguous (inconsistent) for novices might be one that experts could integrate.
Other phenomena of abnormal psychology can be discussed as a merging of seemingly contradictory prototypes. For example, the mechanism of splitting has been postulated to describe, among other things, a young child's difficulty in integrating disparate images (e.g., Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975) . If a child's image of "a good mother" and that of "a bad mother" contained just a few contrasting features that were correlated, the child might not be able to blend them into a description of a single person. But as the child got older, each prototype would expand and previously "split" prototypes might become more readily integrated. Such applications will be examined in future investigations.
